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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS: EASY CASES MAY MAKE BAD LAW
Albert A. Ehrenzweig* and Peter Kay Westen**
before his death, Brainerd Currie deplored the "Conflict,
Crisis and Confusion" in the attempt by New York courts to
reform traditional conflicts law.1 The situation, then serious, has
since deteriorated. Chief Judge Fuld has transplanted his groupingof-contacts theory, nurtured in contract and trust cases2 on the pattern of the English "proper law,"3 into the conflicts law of torts.
Indeed, his opinion in Babcock v. ]ackson4-with its accumulation
of governmental interests, state concerns, and foreign contacts-has
been a less-than-respected trademark abroad of the "revolution" in
American private international law.11
It is increasingly clear that the New York theory consists merely
of "catchwords" 6 which in themselves are either meaningless or circular. To assume that foreign interests, concerns, or contacts are
relevant independent of forum policy is to presuppose the presence
of a superlaw governing the case; 7 yet such a superlaw could only
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I. B. CURRIE, SELEcrEO EssAYS ON THE CoNFLicr OF LAws 690 (1963).
2. In re Bauer's Trust, 14 N.Y.2d 272, 278, 200 N.E.2d 207, 210, 251 N.Y.S.2d
23, 26 (1964) (dissent); Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1961); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). For criticism, see Ehrenzweig, The "Bastard" in the Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace, 29 U. CHI. L.
REV. 498 (1962); A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CoNFLicr OF LAws §§ 142, 174 (1962)
[hereinafter TREATISE].
3. See A. DICEY&: J. MoRRIS, THE CoNFLicr OF LAWS 691-903 (8th ed. 1967). See also
Ehrenzweig, The Not So "Proper" Law of Torts: Pandora's Box, 17 INT. &: COMP. L.Q.
(1968).
4. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
5. See generally G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 253.54 (7th ed. 1965);
Beitzke, Les obligations delictuelles en DIP, 113 REcuEIL DES CouRS 67-68, 98 (1965);
D'OLIVEIRA, INTERNATIONALE VERKEERSSONGELUKKEN: HET SLAGVELD VAN EEN GRONDSLAGENSTRIJD IN HET IPR 9-10 (1965); Drion, The Lex Loci Delicti in Retreat: .d Foreigner's Remarks on Babcock v. Jackson, in FESTscHRIFT FUR Ono RtEsE 225 (1964);
Eek, Babcock in Sweden, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1575 (1966); Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of
Laws, ll2 REcuEIL DES CouRS 93, 118-19 (1964); Vitta, La responsabilita da illecito
nei conflitti di leggi negli Stati Uniti: in margine ad alcune recenti sentenze, 19 DIR11To
lNTERNAZIONALE 212 (1965); Webb, Conflict in Conflicts-Vested Rights Versus Proper
Law: An English Don Reads Babcock, 9 VILL. L. REv. 193 (1964). See also the scathing
comment in R. CRAMTON &: D. CURRIE, CONFLicr OF LAws, CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
258-61 (1968).
6. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d at 486, 19l N.E.2d at 286, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 753
(Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
7. See A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 18 (1967); Ehrenzweig, "False
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be a constitutional or other federal rule allocating such relevance.
On the other hand, to assume that the forum recognizes foreign interests, concerns, or contacts as relevant independent of a superlaw is
to concede that relevance is the result rather than the premise of the
choice-of-law process.
Unhappily, after a short detour, 8 Chief Judge Fuld and the
majority of his court have reaffirmed the Babcock rationale with
regard to both foreign and forum rules of enterprise liability. In
two recent cases, the court has again resorted to interest analysis to
deny applicability of a foreign guest statute9 and of a foreign limitation on wrongful death damages; 10 in another case, the court found
interest analysis necessary even in the interpretation of the owners'
liability statute of the forum. 11 We can only hope that a 1968 dissenting opinion by Judge Breitel, concurred in by Judge Jasen and
supported in its result by Judge Scileppi,12 augurs a retrenchment
or even a "counterrevolution."13
Be this as it may, until recently, Chief Judge Fuld applied his
unfortunate theory in only one area of tort law: that of enterprise
liability, where traditional conflicts formulae had admittedly failed
to produce just results. But this failure resulted less from any deficiency in traditional techniques than from the inadequacy of underlying substantive tort rules which remain couched in terms of
"fault" and "negligence"--concepts which emphasize punishment
rather than distribution of loss.14 Thus, long before Babcock, courts
Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA.
L. REv. 847 (1967).
8. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
9. Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
IO. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
11. Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967).
Concerning this singular disregard for statutory construction, see Ehrenzweig, Comment
on Reich v. Purcell [67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967)], 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 570,
579-83 (1968). See also Ehrenzweig, Foreign Guest Statutes and Forum Accidents:
Against the Desperanto of State "Interests", 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 49 (1968).
12. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 27, 237 NE.2d 883, 887, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 743
(1968), Judge Breitel refutes "governmental-interests" language as "more or less valid," by
stressing that "in civil cases courts attempt to do justice between the parties" and that the
society cannot be said to have "an 'interest' in seeing that its rule of civil law is applied
whenever it has the power to apply it." Instead he sees "the dominant motif [of courts]
in the adjudication of multistate transactions [in their] desire to satisfy the reasonable
expectations of persons participating in transactions." 22 N.Y.2d at 27, 237 N.E.2d
at 886, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 734. Among other relevant factors Judge Breitel mentions the
fact that the offending car was "garaged and insured" in the state of the accident.
22 N.Y.2d at 24, 237 N.E.2d at 884, 290 N.Y.S.2d 744. This consideration may open
the way to the recognition of the increasing relevance of present and desirable insurance
coverage. See TREATISE 580.
13. See Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,
80 HARV. L. REv. 377 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966). See also LaBrum, The Fruits of Babcock and
Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747 (1968).
14. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 7, § 29 (1967) and sources cited therein.
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ignored the traditional formulae and sought a modicum of justice
by invoking various conflicts devices to substitute progressive tort
rules of the forum for such obsolescent foreign rules as those concerning guest-host liability, nonsurvival of actions, interspousal immunity, and limited damages.111 When the Babcock court forged new
tools for this old purpose, it merely reaffirmed a general frustration
in the conflicts law of torts-a frustration which will be relieved only
by fundamental legislative reform of the substantive law of enterprise liability. Viewed in this context, application of the "interest"
theory appears, at least in most cases, to have been harmless and excusable. Yet this has not always been the case. For we may wonder,
as Judge Breitel did in a post-Babcock case,16 whether the New York
court had properly ignored the interest of the state where the accident occurred, where the defendant resided at the time of the accident, and where the car was garaged and insured. In any event, it
would be both harmful and inexcusable to apply the New York
theory in other areas of tort law. The New York Court of Appeals
has now posed this threat by transplanting the Babcock dogma from
the area of enterprise liability into that of intentional torts.
It has been said that hard cases often make bad law.17 The recent
decision by the New York Court of Appeals in James v. Powell 18
suggests that easy cases, too, may make bad law-especially where a
scholarly judge ventures beyond the demands of the case before him.
I.

THE EASY CASE

During an appearance on national television early in 1963, Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., called Mrs. Esther James a "bag
woman" 19 for the New York City police department. During the
15. See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (survival);
Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963) (immunity); Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961)
(damages); Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 194, 247 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct.
1963) (wrongful death statute).
16. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12,237 N.E.2d 877 (1968).
17. Chief Justice Traynor adds the charming aside that hard cases may also make
good law. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; or Hard Cases Can Make Good
Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 223 (1962).
18. 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741, 279 N.Y.S.2d IO (1967). One is tempted to
assume that the Court of Appeals was at least in part motivated by its desire to
protect the defendant against punishment for wrongful conduct (contempt) other
than that involved in the case. See 19 N.Y.2d at 259-61, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 17-19, 225 N.E.2d
at 746-48. The decision has been castigated as "a crude combination of the old and
new approaches that left the law in confusion." Comment, Choice of Law in Fraudulent Conveyance, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1313 (1967). Be this as it may, other distinguished
courts have similarly yielded to the lure of scholarship. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67
Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P .2d 727 (1967).
19. See statement of facts in James v. Powell, 14 N.Y.2d 881, 200 N.E.2d 772, 252
N.Y.S.2d 87, cert. denied, !179 U.S. 966 (1964). Apparently, a "bag woman" is a collector
of graft for policemen.
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next four years, a "long and ugly record"20 developed; Powell was
sentenced to jail for criminal contempt of court,21 took sanctuary in
the Bahamas, 22 and lost his seat in Congress.23 Mrs. James also recovered a $46,500 defamation judgment against Powell.24 Shortly
thereafter, Powell conveyed his real property in Puerto Rico to relatives, whereupon Mrs. James brought a separate action in New York
alleging that Powell had thereby intentionally interfered with the
collection of her earlier judgment. The trial court, in the second action, awarded her compensatory and punitive damages for fraudulent conveyance of land. 25 On appeal, Powell argued that New York
law permits only the holder of a prior lien to recover damages for
such a conveyance. The Appellate Division rejected this contention
and recognized a tort remedy against anyone who intentionally interferes with the collection of a judgment.26
On further appeal, Powell again challenged the existence of such
20. 26 App. Div. 2d 292, 295, 274 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (1966).
21. Mrs, James originally sued Powell for defamation. The damages awarded
to her were reduced as excessive. 20 App. Div. 689, 246 N.Y.S.2d 998, afj'd, 14
N.Y.2d 881, 200 N.E.2d 772, 252 N.Y.S.2d 87, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1964).
To enforce her judgment, Mrs. James subpoenaed Powell for Sept. 20, 1963. He
did not appear. When she moved to punish him for contempt, the court ordered
Powell to appear on May 1, 1964. Upon his second failure to appear, Mrs. James
renewed her motion to punish him for contempt. Powell's defense of constitutional
privilege was denied on May 8, 1964 [43 Misc. 2d 314, 250 N.Y.S.2d 635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1964)], as were his attempts to stay the lower court contempt proceedings [26 App. Div.
2d 779, 273 N.Y.S.2d 756, 27 App. Div. 2d 521, 275 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1966)]. Mrs. James
prevailed in her motion to punish Powell for civil contempt, on the condition
(eventually fulfilled) that the penalty be dismissed upon payment of her underlying
defamation judgment. 26 App. Div. 2d 295, 274 N.Y.S.2d 192, modified, 18 N.Y.2d
931, 223 N.E.2d 562, 277 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1966), afj'd, 19 N.Y.2d 813, 226 N.E.2d 705, 279
N.Y.S.2d 972 (1967).
The trial court then proceeded to prosecute Powell, not for civil contempt of the
Sept. 20 subpoena, but for criminal contempt of its May 1 order to appear,
sentencing him to 30 days in jail and $500 in fines. 52 Misc. 2d 1054, 277 N.Y.S.2d 962
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), appeal dismissed, 27 App. Div. 2d 814, 278 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1967),
motion for stay of commitment denied, motion for preference granted, and hearing
set, 19 N.Y.2d 918,227 N.E.2d 898,281 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1967), dismissal affirmed, 19 N.Y.2d
984, 228 N.E.2d 696, 281 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1967). In addition, it seems that Powell also
faces criminal charges in Puerto Rico for his fraudulent conveyance. N.Y. Times, Aug.
11, 1967, at 29, col. 1.
22. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1967, at 1, col. 8.
23. The Select House Committee which investigated Powell's conduct found that
he had brought discredit upon the House by incurring a contempt citation for failing to pay the New York defamation judgment. 113 CONG. R.Ec. 1918 (daily ed. March
1, 1967). The House then voted to exclude Powell from its body. Id. at 1956. A suit for
reinstatement was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Powell v. McCormack, 266
F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1967). Although Powell was re-elected, even if seated, he would
have forfeited the seniority that had been so valuable to his constituency. See Comment,
The Adam Clayton Powell Case, 45 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1205 (1967); Comment, Exclusion of
a Member-Elect by a House of Congress, 42 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 716 (1967).
24. 20 App. Div. 689, 246 N.Y.S.2d 998, afj'd, 14 N.Y.2d 881, 200 N.E.2d 772, 252
N.Y.S.2d 87, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1964).
25. See 26 App. Div. 2d 525, 270 N.Y.S.2d 789, 790, rev'd 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d
741, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1967) (statement of facts).
26. 25 App. Div. 2d 1, 2,270 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247 (1966).
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a remedy under New York law. 27 The Court of Appeals openly expressed dissatisfaction with the case. After successive contacts with
the disputants, it may have suspected that the lower courts were
using the James litigation to censure Powell for his generally contumacious conduct. Whatever its motivation, the court could have
reversed the judgment below by adding New York to the majority
of jurisdictions28 that denies the existence of the tort of fraudulent
conveyance.29 Instead, the court seized upon a multistate element in
the case as a way of reversing the lower court. Although it relied
upon New York law to deny the plaintiff punitive damages, the
court-on its own motion-decided that the law of Puerto Rico
governed the issue of compensatory damages. In so doing, it resolved
an issue that actually required application of the forum rule of decision. For neither party had pleaded the foreign rule. And even
if one of them had, the foreign rule should not have displaced a lex
fori rule which, subject to the datum of a valid foreign conveyance,
has in effect traditionally governed fraud along with other intentional torts. The court could properly have remanded the case to
determine the validity of the conveyance-and thus the fact of
harm-under Puerto Rican law. But in remanding for the additional purpose of ascertaining the tort law of Puerto Rico, the court
resorted to deviant doctrine and created bad law.
II.

THE BAD

LAw

The Court of Appeals correctly applied New York law to the
award of punitive damages. However, focusing upon the law applicable to punitive as distinct from compensatory damages, the court
indicated that the tort of fraudulent conveyance can be committed
even by a mere "attempt to frustrate satisfaction of a New York judgment."80 Powell would apparently have committed the latter tort
even if his attempt to frustrate the plaintiff's New York judgment
had failed, which would have been the case had Puerto Rico invalidated his conveyance. To be sure, in the light of previous authority,
it is doubtful that the court was justified in assuming the existence
of such a tort. 31 It is equally doubtful-at least on the facts of James
27. 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741,279 N.Y.S.2d IO (1967).
28. See James v. Powell, 25 App. Div. 2d I, 8-10, 266 N.Y.S.2d 245, 249-50 (1966)
(dissent).
29. Indeed, this approach was suggested by the dissenting judge in the Appellate
Division. 25 App. Div. 2d at 4, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 249. See also Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 n.13 (2d Cir. 1967).
30. 19 N.Y.2d at 260,225 N.E.2d at 747, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 18. But see James v. Powell,
25 App. Div. 2d at 12, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 253 (dissent).
31. The court seemed to rely primarily on Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179
N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961). That case, however, dealt with a completed fraud.
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-that the court should have based its ultimate denial of punitive
damages on the absence of "the type of behavior for which punitive
damages are available."32 But there can be no quarrel with the application of New York law to punitive damages in view of the purely
admonitory character of the assumed tort. Indeed, the court's choice
of forum law in this context furnishes an important argument for
the application of forum law to the claim for compensatory damages,
since that claim, in the case of an intentional tort, is also based on the
admonitory character of the liability.
However, with respect to both punitive and compensatory damages, the court gave us bad law by resorting to misleading "interest
analysis," elsewhere referred to as the "Desperanto" of conflicts law.
More unhappily, the court made an unwarranted ex officio choice of
law with regard to compensatory damages; and in doing so it made a
wrong choice by ignoring the distinction between the datum subject
to Puerto Rican law and the rule of decision subject to New York
law.
A. "Interest"

In reversing the punitive damages award, the Court of Appeals
should have applied New York law as a matter of course, recognizing
that most jurisdictions would no more apply a foreign law of punitive damages than a foreign criminal law. It is regrettable, therefore,
that the court justified its application of the lex fori by reference
to the Babcock test of the forum with the "strongest interest in the
resolution of the particular issue presented."33 Interest analysis could
be discounted as harmless surplusage if the court had identified New
York's interest as the admonition of debtors engaging in fraud; such
an interest would necessitate application of the lex fori qua fori.
Instead, the court found that New York's interest was "the protection
of its judgment creditors."34 This conclusion implies that the court
might refuse to award punitive damages against a debtor who maliciously engaged in fraud if the injured creditor resided in another
state. Thus, not only was interest analysis of the issue of punitive
damages unnecessary, but the court also chose to protect the wrong
interest. A similar criticism applies to the court's interest analysis
of the issue of compensatory damages which will be discussed below.
Indeed, a cause of action entitling the plaintiff to at least nominal compensatory
damages seems to be a general requirement. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 13 (3d ed. 1964).
32. 19 N.Y.2d at 260, 225 N.E.2d at 747, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
!Ill. 19 N.Y.2d at 259, 225 NE.2d at 747, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 18 [quoting Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 47!1, 484, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 74!1, 752 (1963)).
!14. 19 N.Y.2d at 260, 225 N.E.2d at 747, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
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B. Unpleaded Foreign Law
According to long-standing practice in cases wherein a foreign
rule of decision is not pleaded by either party, most courts, including
those of New York, apply the law of the forum unless there is a
public interest in applying foreign law.315 However, some courts in
this country and abroad continue to adhere to the fiction of a superlaw-whether grounded in a theory of vested rights, of a jus gentium,
or more recently of a general distribution of legislative jurisdictions.
Having assumed that-according to such a superlaw--each case is
governed by a particular law, these courts have been reluctant to
permit the parties a different choice. The resulting compulsion to
discover the controlling law-regardless of party pleading and preference-has been rejected as an erroneous "imperative conception of
the choice-of-law rule." 36
Until the James case New York remained free of this error. As
early as 1851, the Court of Appeals declared that New York law was
"prima fade, the rule of decision; and if either party wishes the
benefit of a different rule of law ... he must aver and prove it."37
But the court in James deviated sharply from this principle. Although both parties submitted their cases under New York law and
the lower courts acquiesced in that submission, the Court of Appeals
reversed on an unargued motion of its own that the "legal consequences of the defendant's acts in this case must be determined
under the law of Puerto Rico." 38 At the very least, the court should
first have ascertained whether any difference existed between the
potentially applicable laws of New York and Puerto Rico.39 Even
casual research would have disclosed that the law of Puerto Rico,
like that of New York, offers a remedy for intentional infliction of
loss through interference with the collection of a judgment:'0 More35. See A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, §§ 98-115.
36. B. CuRRIE, supra note 1, at 52 (1963).
37. Monroe v. Douglas, 5 N.Y. 447, 452 (1851). Accord Jacobi v. Drucker, ll8
N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953); and, with some modification, Arams v. Arams,
45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943); Brandwein v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 150
N.Y.S.2d 429, 431-32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956); Albers v. Credit Suisse, 67 N.Y.S.2d 239
(N.Y. City Court 1946); Russell v. Societe Anonyme des Etablissements Aeroxon, 268
N.Y. 173, 197 N.E. 185 (1935).
38. 19 N.Y.2d at 256,225 N.E.2d at 745, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
39. Cf. Goldberg v. Faull, 275 F. Supp. 96, 97 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). See generally
A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 7, § 36 (1967).
40. C6DIGO CIVIL, art. 1802, on the pattern of all European civil codes (see, e.g.,
FRENCH CODE CIVIL art. 1382, GERMAN CIVIL CoDE § 823, AusrRIAN CIVIL CODE § 1295)
provides for tort damages for any infliction of harm through "culpa o negligencia."
This provision has been, without specific regulation, interpreted as including such
intentional torts as malicious prosecution or abuse of process. See generally Amadeo,
.A.cciones civiles de daiios "j perjuicios en el derecho puertorriqueiio por el uso
injustificado de los procedimientos legales, 14 REv. JUR. U. PUERTO Rxco 37 (1944). The
requirement of "unlawfulness" common to civil-law tort provisions, is typically satis-
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over, the court should not have instructed the lower court to apply
the law of Puerto Rico without allowing for the (likely) possibility
that a Puerto Rican court in this case would itself have applied the
law of New York as the lex loci delicti and the law common to the
parties.41 For, whether or not desirable, 42 renvoi is now part of the
conflicts law of New York.43
More serious, the court justified its "imperative conception of
the choice-of-law rule" by invoking section 4511 of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules, which merely allows a court to take
judicial notice of foreign law already found applicable. 44 It is disconcerting enough for a court to make an ex officio choice of law in
a case which the parties have chosen to rest upon forum law. 45 It is
even more disquieting for a court to derive that choice-of-law prerogative from a statute which does nothing but lessen the evidentiary
burdens of pleading and proving foreign law.46 For a judicial-notice
fied by the criminal character of any act serving the frustration of judgment execu•
tion. The Penal Code of Puerto Rico contains such criminal sanctions which,
particularly if read against art. 443 of the Spanish Penal Code of March 29, 1963,
clearly cover the case at bar. See also German Supreme Court, RGZ 143, 267, 272
(1933) with reference to BGB § 823(2) and StGB § 288.
41. On the statutist approach of Puerto Rican courts see Conde, La regla Lex rei
sitae en la doctrina Puertorriquefia de conflictos de leyes, 30 REV. JuR. U. PUERTO Rico
57, 63-65 (1961): Hernandez, Jurisprudencia del tribunal supremo de Puerto Rico en
materia de derecho internacional privado, 6 REv. JUR. U. PUERTO RICO 147 (1936).
See also Amadeo v. Registrador, 3 P.R.R. 262 (1903) (limiting the lex situs to "acts or
contracts directly affecting immovables").
42. See A. EHkENZWEIG, supra note 7, §§ 68-77 (1967).
43. See, e.g., In re Schneider's Estate, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Surr. Ct.), afj'd on reargument, 100 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950). See also Mason v. Rose, 176 F.2d 486, 489
(2d Cir. 1949).
44. 19 N.Y.2d at 259, 225 N.E.2d at 746, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 17. See generally Miller,
Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell
for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 613, 617-37 (1967).
45. For a notorious example, see Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 2113 F.2d 541
(2d Cir. 1956).
46. Section 4511, formerly § 344--a of the Civil Practice Act, was designed to make it
easier for parties and for the court-having chosen a foreign law-to establish its
contents. While it had once been necessary to invoke costly and exhausting methods
for proving the content of foreign law through affidavits, exhibits, and expert testimony,
this statute eliminated that burden by allowing the court to take judicial notice of
such foreign laws. 9 N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL ANN. REP. 271 (1943). In other words, the
statute was designed to overcome the "expense and burden involved in complying with
the rules of evidence." Jefferies, Recognition of Foreign Law by American Courts, 35
U. C1N. L. REv. 578, 610 n.141 (1966). See generally Saxe, New York Extends Judicial
Notice to Matters of Law, 28 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 86 (1944); Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign
Law in New York: A Proposed Amendment, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 348 (1957). See also
Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 331, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253-54 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ("I think
this new enactment was intended merely to dispense with certain formalities respecting
the manner in which the law of a state or country ••• may be brought to the attention
of the court by the parties, and, in case they omit something pertinent, to give the
judge the right to make an accurate determination as to what the law of that state
or country really is. In short, the enactment was intertded as a safety valve against
miscarriages of justice due to mistake, and not as a charter to every judge to apply
whatsoever law he likes and can find.').
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statute operates as a rule of evidence only upon a law which is already before the court through prior and independent choice of
law.47 The Court of Appeals apparently construed this rule as requiring the judiciary to make an ex officio choice of law in every
multistate case regardless of the pleadings. Thus, the court abandoned its own earlier practice and disregarded a view held widely
in this country and abroad. 48 However, the New York court may yet
return to the prevailing and preferable view. Judge Breitel, writing
for a unanimous court in April 1968, noted that "[n]one of the
parties [had] questioned that the New York statutes should be applied ...." Therefore, the court "assumed, as did the parties, that
New York law applies ...." 49

C. Rule of Decision or Datum
Even assuming the existence of an "imperative" rule compelling
an ex officio choice of law, the Court of Appeals incorrectly chose the
law of Puerto Rico as the rule of decision in the James case. To be
sure, even under a New York rule of decision, Puerto Rican conveyancing law was relevant-as a datum-in establishing the plaintiff's cause of action. But the court applied foreign law to the "legal
consequences of the defendants' acts" on the ground that "the validity of a conveyance of a property interest is governed by the law
of the place where the property is located."50 From the premise that
Puerto Rican law governed the validity of the conveyance, the court
thus concluded that the same law must govern all other legal consequences of that conveyance.
The court assumed that all conveyances are governed by the lex
situs. As a general statement encompassing conveyances of both personal and real property, this assumption is incorrect; 51 the validity
of transfers of personal property has rested, variously, with the law
of the situs, the law of the defendant's domicile, or the law of the
forum. 52 Even general application of the lex situs to conveyances of
real property has been challenged as a regression to the obsolete
4:7, See Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 CoLUM. L. REv.
964, 974 n.32 (1958).
48. TREATISE §§ 99, 101, 102 (1967). See also CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 311 (West 1967);
Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 74, 119-22 (1967). But cf. Advisory Committee's Notes to Fed. Rule 44.1 (as amended 1966).
49. Trionics Research Sales Corp. v. Nautec Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 574, 237 N.E.2d 68,
69, 289 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (1968) (emphasis added).
50. 19 N.Y.2d at 256, 225 N.E.2d at 745, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
51. See In re Lea Fabrics, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 232, 236 (D.N.J. 1964) (validity of
transfer) ("Intangibles have no situs."). See also Buchman v. American Foam Rubber
Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
52. See TREATISE §§ 235, 236.
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formulae of vested rights.153 Whatever its possible virtues or shortcomings otherwise, the lex situs has no bearing on the issue of
whether a conveyance valid under the law of Puerto Rico (lex situs)
is a tort under the law of New York (lex fori). The validity of a
conveyance is relevant only as a datum establishing the existence of
a tortious injury.
In order to state a claim for relief, Esther James had to demonstrate: that she had a valid New York judgment against Powell;
that "Puerto Rico regarded the property when it was owned by
[Powell] as . . . being subject to execution or attachment"; that
the attempted conveyance was valid under Puerto Rican law or, if
invalid, would at least have "blocked or checked [her] efforts to reach
the land"; and that "under the law of Puerto Rico, the land . . .
[would not have] remained subject [to] execution even after such a
transfer."154 Plaintiff looked to New York law to establish that she
had a valid outstanding judgment, and to Puerto Rican law to establish that Powell's conveyance prevented her from satisfying her
judgment. But this reference to the lex situs was merely for factual
support-to establish the datum of the validity of the conveyance;
it had nothing to do with the choice of the applicable substantive
law of tort.
None of the reasons advanced by the court support its contrary
conclusion. First, the court seems to have based its application of
the lex situs on a "characterization" of the issue as one concerning
land. But, the technique of characterization is circular in purpose
and execution. 55 Whether an issue "concerns land" with respect to
a particular legal rule can be answered only in light of the policies
underlying that rule; 56 to ascertain the policies underlying a legal
rule, however, is to decide the question of the rule's applicability.
In cases involving fraudulent conveyance of land, for instance, the
decision to characterize the action as one in tort or as one of immovables can be made only after inquiring into the policies under53. Curiously, it was Chief Judge Fuld himself who attacked the "inflexible rule"
of the lex situs, dissenting in In re Bauer's Trust, 14 N.Y.2d 272, 278, 200 N.E.2d 207,
210, 251 N.Y.S.2d 23, 27 (1964), a case involving the invalidating effect of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. See also Hancock, Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land
Taboo fo Conflict of Laws: The Disadvantages of Disingenuousness, 20 STAN. L. R.Ev.
I (1967); Weintraub, An Inquiry into the Utility of "Situs" as a Concept in Conflicts
Analysis, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1966).
54. 19 N.Y.2d at 257,225 N.E.2d at 745, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 15-16. Authorities cited by
the court included such doubtful sources as a federal pre-Erie case involving forum
land [Marcus v. Kane, 18 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1927)] and REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNFLICTS § 218 (Tent. Draft. No. 5, 1959).
55. See Ehrenzweig, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws: An Unwelcome Addition to American Doctrine, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFUCI'S LAw !195
(1961).
56. TRU.TIS:t: §§ 110-14; A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 7, at §§ 52-56.
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lying tort liability for fraud. Having made that inquiry, we have
made the choice of law without resorting to the circular process of
characterization.
It is now generally agreed that a question should be characterized as one concerning land, and thus subjected to the lex situs,
only in cases involving trespass to land57 and the security of title.
The conflicts law of contracts rather than that of immovables controls capacity to contract, 58 the measure of damages for breach,59
permissible rates of mortgage interest, 60 construction of the wording
of conveyances, 61 validity of personal covenants not running with
the land, 62 legal incidents of obligations secured by mortgages, 63
liability for deficiency upon foreclosure, 64 and agreements to assume
a mortgage. 65 In the same manner, the conflicts law of torts rather
than that of immovables controls liability for misrepresentation in
the sale of land66 and-we might add-fraudulent conveyances.
As a second rationale for applying the law of Puerto Rico, the
James court indicated that a court "should, as a general rule, afford
the plaintiff no greater or lesser remedy than she is given under
the law creating the right which the remedy is designed to safeguard."67 To hear that "rights" are "created" under foreign law68 is
surprising to those of us who thought that such vested rights expired
with the first Restatement. 69 To find further that the same law must
govern both right and remedy is both a jurisprudential error and
an unexplained deviation from New York doctrine, which has long
57. See, e.g., Widmer v. Wood, 243 Ark. 457, 420 S.W.2d 828 (1967). This rule is
probably a relic of the "land taboo" (see TREATISE § 58, at 209-11, et passim),
preserved even in jurisdictions which, like Arkansas, have abandoned the "local action"
concept.
58. See, e.g., Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897). See generally
Herzog, The Conflict of Laws in Land Transactions: The Borderline Between Contract
and Property Matters- A Comparative View, 8 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 191 (1957); TREATISE
§§ 231-!14; Williams, Land Contracts in the Conflict of Laws-Lex Situs: Rule or Exception, 11 HAsTINGS L.J. 159 (1957).
59. See, e.g., Selover, Bates &: Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112 (1912); Atwood v. Walker,
179 Mass. 514, 61 N.E. 58 (1901).
60. See, e.g., Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194 (1867). See generally Comment, Usury
in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris, 55 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 123
(1967); R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 203, at 296, 297, 301 (Proposed
Official Draft, Part II 1968).
61. See, e.g., Brown v. National Bank, 44 Ohio 269, 6 N.E. 648 (1886).
62. See, e.g., Bethell v. Bethell, 54 Ind. 428, 23 Am. Rep. 650 (1876).
63, See, e.g., Burr v. Beckler, 264 Ill. 230, 106 N.E. 206 (1914) (validity of note).
64, See, e.g., Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 App. Div. 383, 91 N.Y.S. 1062 (1905) (but lex
situs applied in effect).
65. See, e.g., Clement v. Willett, 105 Minn. 267, 117 N.W. 491 (1908) (forum law).
66. See, e.g., Dale v. Fulton, 5 John Ch. 173 (1821); E. M. Fleischmann Lumber
Corp. v. Resources Corp. International, 105 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1952); R.EsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNFUCT OF LAws § 148(2)(e) (Proposed Official Draft, Part II 1968).
67. 19 N.Y.2d at 257, 225 N.E.2d at 745, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (emphasis added).
68. 19 N.Y.2d at 259, 225 N.E.2d at 746, 279 NY.S.2d at 17 (emphasis added).
69. See EHR:!NZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 20.
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recognized that different laws may govern causes of action and
damages. 70
Furthermore, the court applied Puerto Rican law on what it considered the "sound jurisprudential principle" that courts "should
accord [to foreign situs law] the recognition which comity between
enlightened governments requires." 71 The court thus indicated that,
even if not compelled to do so, it could nonetheless apply the lex
situs as a friendly gesture to the government of Puerto Rico. Unlike
the use of comity in recognition of foreign judgments, however, the
"principle" of comity in relation to choice of law is applicable only
in those rare cases where a foreign government has a compelling
interest in resolving a particular matter under its own law. For example, in Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense,12 a Maryland resident brought wrongful death suit against a
Brazilian airline for an accident over Brazil. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit applied the Brazilian limitationof-damages rule on the ground that the Brazilian government had a
specific interest in limiting liability in order to foster its burgeoning
commercial airline industry.73 In James, the court might conceivably
have found that Puerto Rico desired comity concerning the validity
of conveyances of land in Puerto Rico in order to safeguard the
security of its land titles; but it could hardly have found such a desire
concerning foreign tort claims which did not in any way concern
the Commonwealth.
Finally, the court indicated that it would be "unrealistic to give
the plaintiff a cause of action for fraud against the debtor and others
on the basis of their having made a conveyance of property in
Puerto Rico if what they did was perfectly valid under the law of
that jurisdiction."74 But permitting such an action would be eminently realistic, since the validity of the conveyance, as noted earlier,
is in most cases an essential datum for the imposition of any liability
for fraud. Ironically, the court itself would apparently have granted
a remedy without regard to the validity of the conveyance under
Puerto Rican law by awarding punitive damages for an attempted
but invalid conveyance.75
70. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 2ll N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961); Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967). See TREATISE
§ 33, ll9-20 (1962).
71. 19 N.Y.2d at 258, 225 N.E.2d at 746, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 17 (emphasis added). The
case relied on is hardly analogous. In In re Utassi's Will, 15 N.Y.2d 436, 209 N.E.2d 65,
261 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1965) the New York court, in true international comity, conceded to a
Swiss city the right to escheat securities located in New York.
72. 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966).
73. 350 F.2d at 471-72.
74. 19 N.Y.2d at 258, 225 N.E.2d at 746, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 17 (emphasis added).
75. See text accompanying note 30 supra. See also In re Circle Tracling Corp., 26
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D. Lex Situs or Lex Fori

Having discounted the question of the validity of the conveyance
as a mere datum, the appropriate rule of decision must still be ascertained. Assuming, without conceding, that the court was free to
choose ex officio between forum or situs law absent both a compelling
public interest and an invocation of foreign law by either party, the
court should have applied the tort rule of the forum rather than that
of Puerto Rico on grounds of reason, authority, and "theory."
Reason ordinarily requires application of forum law in cases
involving intentional torts because liability in this area is designed
to admonish and deter. If the defendant acted in reliance upon
foreign law, fairness may justify application of that law; 76 but otherwise the forum should apply its own ethical standards. The history of
fraudulent conveyances and of the conflicts law of intentional torts
suggests this result.
The Statute of Elizabeth, 77 which in 1571 began the modern development of the law of fraudulent conveyances, imposed criminal
and remedial sanctions in favor of the Queen and injured creditors.78 Under that statute, the Star Chamber applied English law as
a matter of course. Similarly, when equity intervened to allow a
creditor to avoid a fraudulent conveyance,79 the Chancellor applied
his own "conscience" without regard to the situs of the property.
F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1928), permitting defendant exculpation by proving title under
foreign law.
76. See text accompanying notes 88-93 infra. Significantly both cases cited in Comment, supra note 18, at 1319 n.42, to support the proposition that damages for fraud
are governed by the lex loci delicti, apply in effect the law of the forum. See Lowrey
v. Dingmann, 251 Minn. 124, 86 N.W.2d 499 (1957); Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278
F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1960).
77. 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1571) [repealed 15 Geo. V, c. 20 § 172, at 695 (1925)]. For Roman
antecedents, see Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REv. 109
(1931). See also o. BUMP, CONVEYANCES MADE BY DEBTORS To DEFRAUD CREDITORS (4th
ed. 1896); 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 58-62 (2d ed. 1940);
c. MooRE, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1908); 6 POWELL, OUR PROPERTY 74 (1965); w.
ROBERTS, TREATISE RELATING TO VOLUNTARY AND FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1800); S.
RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTIONS,
ch. 6 (1967); F. WAIT, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (3d ed. 1897); Cohen, Attachment of
Property Fraudulently Transferred in New York, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 501 (1949); Radin,

Fraudulent Conveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
27 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1938); Wolson, Transfers in Fraud of Creditors, 55 COMMERCIAL L.J.
5 (1950); Comment, Limitations and Fraudulent Conveyances of Real Property, 41
TEXAS L. REV. 814 (1963).
78. Statute followed statute to combat continuing abuse, prompting the Star
Chamber to agree with an anonymous poet's anguished dystichon:
Why, one may ask, do statutes grow to such numerous volumes?
This is as it must be, fraud is growing apace.
(Queritur, ut crescunt tot magna volumina legis?
In promptu causa est, crcscit in orbe dolus).
Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 815 (1601). See also 1 G. GLENN, supra note 77,
§§ 48-62.
79. See Mannocke's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (1571).
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His decision to take jurisdiction over an action involving foreign
land was itself a decision to apply the law of the forum. 8° For, as
stated in 1682 in an argument apparently approved by the court:
"If the laws of Ireland so far differ from the laws here ... as to allow
of a fraud or a cheat, this court had then the greater reason to retain
this cause and see justice done." 81 In another early case, much relied
upon in this country, the Chancellor ordered reconveyance of land
fraudulently obtained on the island of St. Christopher because
"this Court will not permit the defendant to avail himself of the
law of any country to do what would be gross injustice."82 American
courts sitting in equity, having in large part shared the English experience, 83 have followed the same principle.84 Foreign law-usually
that of the place where defendant's conduct occurred or that of
plaintiff's domicile-has been admitted only to validate transactions85 which would have been invalid under one of the forum's
increasingly technical and decreasingly moral presumptions of
fraud. 86
In contrast to the experience in equity, there is little conflicts
authority at law for fraudulent conveyance of land. Although the
80. Arglasse v. Muschamp, 23 Eng. Rep. 322, (1682): Penn v. Baltimore, l
Ves. Sen. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (1750); Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810)
(Marshall, C.J.). For a recent case involving damages, see Starr v. Berry, 25 N.J. 573, 138
A.2d 44 (1958). See generally Comment, Tort Liability for Fraudulent Conveyances, 19
STAN. L. REv. 636 (1967).
81. Arglasse v. Muschamp, 23 Eng. Rep. 322 (1682).
82. Cranston v. Johnston, 30 Eng. Rep. 952 (1796), 31 Eng. Rep. 586 (1800). For the
possible relevance of the lex actus in this and the Arglasse case, see notes 83-84 infra.
83. For criminal statutes, see, e.g., Smith v. Blake, I Day 258, 262 (Conn. 1804);
Fogg v. Lawry, 71 Me. 215, 216 (1880): Spaulding v. Fisher, 57 Me. 411, 414 (1869);
Wilder v. Winne, 6 Cow. 284, 287 (N.Y. 1826); Wright v. Eldred, 2 Aik. 401 (Vt. 1827).
See also P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 1814 (1956). Cf. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, ch. 59,
§ 1613 (1964) ($1,000 fine plus less than one year in jail); CAL. PENAL CODE § 531 (West
1955) (misdemeanor).
Connecticut maintained a forfeiture provision for fraud until 1911. CoNN. GEN.
STAT. § 1092 (1902), reprinted in M. BIGELOW, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 28 (Knowlton
ed. 1911). See also Webb v. Long, 17 Vt. 587 (1845).
The Elizabethan statute, supra note 77, survives in federal law. See United States
v. Bess, 243 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1957). The UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCE Ac:r § 11
adopted in a majority of states, upholds expressly any existing rules concerning the
"effect of fraud." 9B U.L.A. 273 (1966).
84. For New York, e.g., see D'Ivernois v. Leavitt, 23 Barb. 63, 80 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1856),
declaring with regard to transactions relating to real "property in other states, [that]
if our law deems them fraudulent, it is within the province of this court to declare
them void."
·
85. On the presumption of validity in general, see A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 69, at
45 (1967).
86. This result has been regularly achieved by declaring inapplicable the forum
statute as lacking "extraterritorial" scope. See, e.g., Merchants' Bank v. Bank of United
States, 2 La. App. 659 (1847); Williams v. Dry Goods Co., 4 Okla. 145 (1896); Thurston
v. Rosenfield, 42 Mo. 474 (1868); Greene v. Sprague Mfg. Co., 52 Conn. 330, 362
(1884) (but see dissent, at 373, 392); Bentley v. Whittemore, 19 N.J. Eq. 462 (1868);
Chafee v. Fourth Nat'! Bank of N.Y., 71 Mc. 514 (1880); May v. First Nat'! Bank, 122
Ill. 551, HI N.E. 806 (1887).
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Chancellor was not reluctant to take jurisdiction over parties to
disputes concerning foreign land, the law courts generally declined
such jurisdiction.87 Moreover, even though law courts are slowly
losing that reluctance, only a minority of jurisdictions now recognizes a substantive remedy in tort for fraudulent conveyance of land.
Thus, we must draw needed inferences from the general conflicts
law of intentional torts.
The conflicts treatment of intentional torts is characterized by
an interplay between the law of the forum and the law of the
place of acting-the lex actus. The ancestry of such torts in criminal
law and equity seems to call for the application of forum law. On
the other hand, the persisting quasi-criminal character of tort law
also required courts to make allowance for defendants who could
not have anticipated the application of forum law; accordingly, such
defendants were permitted to show that their conduct was proper
under the lex actus. Thus, in the leading Commonwealth88 and
American89 cases the defendants were permitted to justify their behavior under the law of the place of acting. However, such justifications have remained the exception. The adulterer claiming protection
under an anti-heart-balm statute of the state of seduction90 is no more
likely to prevail than the liquor dealer claiming nonexistence of a
dram shop act at the place of a drunken accident91 or, for that matter,
than the fraudulent debtor claiming indulgence from the state where
he committed his fraud.92 On remand, Powell will hardly be heard
to allege a Puerto Rican definition of fraud more lenient than that
of New York. A "moral" standard of fraud is always a datum under
forum law.98
87. It has been said that a court may not take jurisdiction in an action to set aside
fraudulent conveyances of foreign land. West Point Min. &: Mfg. Co. v. Allen, 143 Ala.
547, 39 S. 351 (1905); Smith v. Schlein, 144 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1944). See generally
TREATISE § 39, 140. But see Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N.Y. 327 (1860); Pingree v. Coffin, 78
Mass. (12 Gray) 288, 304-05 (1858).
88. Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (1870).
89. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 21!1 U.S. 347 (1909).
90. See Ehrenzweig, Alienation of Affections in the Conflict of Laws, 45 CORNELL
L.Q. 514 (1960).
91. TREATISE § 215(7).
92. TREATISE § 215(3). Concerning conversion, see, e.g., Keller v. Paine, 107 N.Y. 8!l,
1!1 N.E. 635 (1887); for defamation, Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab., Inc.,
269 F.2d !175, !192-94 (9th Cir. 1959) ("closest relationship').
9!l. See A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 69, § 34; Ehrenzweig, Local and Moral Data in the
Conflict of Laws, 16 BUFF. L. REv. 55 (1966); Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neeley, 361 F.2d 36, 41
(10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840, 942 (1966) (purporting to apply a foreign standard without indicating a difference from the standard of the forum); Myers v. Council
Mfg. Corp., 276 F. Supp. 541, 547 (W.D. Ark. 1967) (application of lex loci rather than
lex fori "probably of no consequence'). Full documentation is forthcoming in Ehrenzweig, Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law, in REcuEIL DES CouRS DE
L'ACADEll(U DJ! DRorr INTERNATIONAL (1968).
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Authority, too, dictates application of forum law. To be sure,
the Court of Appeals in James construed its own ruling in Wyatt v.
Fulrath 94 as applying "the law of the situs [New York] to determine
whether the Spanish heirs of a Spanish domiciliary were defrauded
by his testamentary transfers of chattels through joint bank accounts
maintained in New York .... " 95 But that construction is partly incorrect and partly inconclusive. There was no assertion of fraud in
Wyatt; and the court was there concerned with the parties' "legal
capacity" 96 rather than with their liability in tort. Furthermore, in
applying New York law the Wyatt court was motivated by considerations far different from regard for the law of the situs qua situs. Not
only did the court wish to give effect to the parties' stipulation that
"New York law [should] apply to the property they place here,'' 07
but it was also concerned with New York's truly governmental
(economic and political) interest in applying her own law to create
a sanctuary for property owners relying upon "the general stability
of our Government," 98-a far cry from the James court's application
of a foreign law to create a potential haven for acts fraudulent under
the law of New York!
Not only does Wyatt fail as support for James, but there is also
good authority against the interpretation of the Court of Appeals
in the latter case. In Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,99
Judge Learned Hand determined the availability of damages under
New York law against grantees fraudulently receiving foreign land.
Speaking for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, he conceded that "the law of the situs absolutely determines the validity of
conveyances wherever made," and that "title passed ... to property
situated in those ... states whose laws did not forbid such transfers." 100
However, he also concluded that "the law of New York might still
make receipt of the deed a wrong and impose liability upon the
grantee even though he got a good title." 101 There is little doubt that
Judge Hand would have applied the same reasoning to a case involving a fraudulent grantor. In a closely related case an attorney
who conducted litigation in Austria for the purpose of frustrating a
New Yark transaction was sued in New Yark for abuse of process.
94. 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
95. 19 N.Y.2d at 256-57, 225 N.E.2d at 745, 279 N.Y .S.2d at 15.
96. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 172, 211 N.E.2d 637, 638, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234
(1965).
97. 16 N.Y.2d at 173,211 N.E.2d at 639, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
98. 16 N,Y.2d at 173,211 N.E.2d at 639, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 236. See also Judge Keating's
interpretation of Wyatt in In re Estate of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281
N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
99. 83 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 571 (1936).
100. 83 F.2d at 171.
IOI. 83 F.2d at 171.
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The Second Circuit discounted Austrian law as a potentially applicable lex actus by regarding "the Austrian legal process ... simply
[as] the means employed to effectuate"102 the defendant's alleged
design. Judge Friendly's majority opinion proceeded on the assumption that New York would not "refuse to recognize a claim for abuse
of process that it would have recognized if the proceedings had taken
place in its own courts ...." 103 Clearly, this intentional tort was subject to the moral standards of the forum. Finally, forum law has been
applied in many cases to determine the fraudulent character of
foreign conveyances on the ground, admittedly less compelling, that
the question was one of procedure.104 Happily, in 1968, the New
York Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Breitel, found no
difficulty in interpreting a New York statute which prohibited "illegal transfers" by foreign insolvent corporations as applicable to foreign assets. 10 :s
Since reason and authority fail to support the holding in James,
only the court's resort to "theory" remains to be examined. As previously indicated, the court subjected the claim for compensatory
damages to the Puerto Rican tort law since Puerto Rican law governed the validity of the conveyance; 106 the court identified that law
as the lex situs. 107 The court could have rested its decision to remand
the case for the ascertainment of Puerto Rican law on the traditional
lex situs doctrine-however erroneous. But it chose otherwise, apparently intending to introduce for intentional torts108 the same
"interest" analysis and "contacts" approach which it had previously
adopted for enterprise liability, contracts, and trusts. 109 The opinion
asserts that the law of Puerto Rico is applicable not merely under
the traditional lex situs rule but, "to put the matter somewhat differently," because "the availability of a remedy to a judgment creditor who has been prevented from levying execution by a transfer of
land located in [Puerto Rico] constitutes a matter of policy which
is properly determinable by the law of Puerto Rico . . . ." 110 The
102. Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 853
(1963), citing TREATISE §§ 215, 558, 563. See also Kluck v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 378, 155
N.W.2d 26 (1967), similarly treating the foreign proceedings as a mere datum subject
to foreign law in a case of false arrest.
103. Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 1963).
104. See H. A. Lavanne Co. v. Katz, 156 F. Supp. 636, 639 (D. Md. 1957), which
relied on Feist v. Druckerman, 70 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1934) (Augustus Hand, J.).
105. Trionics Re~carch Sales Corp. v. Nautec Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 574, 237 N.E.2d 68,
289 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1968).
106. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
107. Id.
108. See notes 76-105 supra and the accompanying text.
109. See note 2 supra.
110. 19 N.Y.2d at 257-58, 225 N.E.2d at 745, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
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term "policy" in this context is used synonymously with the term
"interest";111 this is clear from the juxtaposition of the statement
just quoted with the preceding concession that New York could
"legitimately"112 claim an "interest" in the matter only if Puerto
Rico were to discriminate "against New Yark judgment creditors
as compared with local judgment creditors. " 118
Are we to understand that such a New York "interest" would
have given the plaintiff a remedy-although she had suffered no loss
as a result of the defendant's fraud-if her New York citizenship
alone would have disqualified her under Puerto Rican law from
levying on her New York judgment in Puerto Rico? Conversely,
would the absence of such a New York "interest" have deprived a
Puerto Rican plaintiff of a remedy-although he had suffered a loss
as a result of the defendant's fraud-if under Puerto Rican law his
citizenship would have enabled him to levy on the New York judgment? Whatever the answers to these questions, it is less than clear
how the court could find an "interest" of Puerto Rico in the application of her law to litigation between two New York citizens concerning damages which could not in any way affect title to Puerto Rican
land.
IV. CONCLUSION
On reason, authority, and "theory" the James court failed, then,
to explain its application of foreign law. The remedy for the intentional tort of fraudulent conveyance, like that of all intentional
torts, must remain primarily subject to the law of the forum since
-as we have demonstrated-the defendant could not possibly have
claimed justifiable reliance on the lex actus. By analyzing this case
in the "modern" terms of prevailing "interests" and "contacts," as
well as in the obsolete terms of "comity" and "foreign-created
rights," the New York Court of Appeals has given us bad law. We
hope that this distinguished court will now end the "crisis and confusion" in the conflicts law of New York and lead us into what will
no longer facetiously be called a "new era of enlightenment." 114
111. Even Currie's terminology ultimately results in the interchangeable use of these
terms. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 69, § 25, at 63-64.
ll2. 19 N.Y.2d at 258, 225 N.E.2d at 745, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 16. On the circular character of this test which presupposes a superlaw determining legitimacy, see A. EHREN·
ZWEIG, supra note 69, § 25 at 63·64.
ll3. 19 N.Y.2d at 258, 225 N.E.2d at 745, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
114. Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: An Opinion for the New York
Court of Appeals, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 459,460 (1967); cf. the sequel, Ehrenzweig, Foreign
Guest Statutes and Forum Accidents: Against a Desperanto of Conflicts Law, 68 CoLUM,
L. REV. 49 (1968).

